While fixture-level disaggregation of water data has a number of applications in decision support systems, it also gives rise to data privacy risks. This paper presents a system of algorithms that identify and detect water activity events, and then analyse disaggregated information to distinguish between privacy-sensitive behaviour and incongruent data due to technical faults or leakages. The process running in real-time is implemented within the Complex Event Processor (CEP) of WSO2 and the ICeWater project. Results provide insights of future directions in theoretical aspects of disaggregation, privacy and CEP system implementation.
Introduction
Advances in water sensor communications and ICT-integrated smart city technologies are key drivers for managing water networks better. An example of such an ICT approach is the ICeWater project, which uses open source WSO2 middleware to support Decision Support Systems (DSS) and heterogeneous sensor infrastructures. However, with the advent of high granularity Automated Meter Reading (AMR) on customer connections, and the adoption of such data driven open software platforms, the privacy issues become more pronounced.
There is no single approach to privacy protection emerging in the water domain. This is despite the fact that similar data protection requirements exist in Europe as this only relates to protecting data of individuals and not aggregate consumption data. Some countries are taking a stricter approach than others in this respect, for instance recent legislation in Germany is favouring the adoption of high levels of security for smart metering to protect privacy as well as preventing tampering or other forms of security attack. However, in other countries no security measures are mandated at all. In the future with the roll-out of smart metering within individual premises or dwellings the privacy related issues will need careful consideration to strike the right balance between cost and level of protection.
The main concern with privacy related to the AMR or smart meter data is that third parties can determine or deduce sensitive information related to the users activities. There is clearly a level of granularity, in time and also in terms of the number of aggregated users, at which it becomes improbable that third parties could gain any useful information.
However, this level depends not only on the number of users but on their types of usage and which usage events are most critical. For instance, if is it easy to determine a shower usage event and it is possible to deduce that a particular user is the most likely to be causing this event, then it will become more sensitive information. Apart from the privacy related concerns, there are benefits of being able to identify individual types of usage events in order to provide feedback to users on how they may be able to save water and energy. For instance, it is important to determine whether they have inefficient fixtures or customer-side leakage. This is an aspect of water resource management that can benefit both users and utilities, but needs to have mutual agreement on sharing of the data for this purpose.
While water data privacy has not been studied in prior art, there is a body of work in AMR for electricity data, in which privacy is defined as a probability of detecting a hidden trace of events, given a perturbed or aggregated signal containing such events [1] . Further, in privacy-preserving data mining, the statistical metric of differential privacy [2] studies a class of privacy perturbations that have negligible effect on publicized statistics.
The reverse problem of privacy is the problem of disaggregation. This involves decomposing an aggregate water consumption profile into its constituent water consumption profiles of individual fixtures or water-related activities such as meal preparation. As discussed above, one application is to provide customer feedback (e.g. measures to help minimise excessive water use, identify high flow fixtures, use of tap running are compared with the community). A further important application for the utilities includes improved demand forecasting.
Existing solutions to this challenge are typically expensive (by installing additional hardware at water pipes before connecting to fixtures) or they may depend on the analysis of high frequency flow data, e.g. 500 Hz [3] . While similar promising technologies are based on low-cost flow rate sensing at a lower, but still fine, granularity of 2 Hz, [4] , many existing installations have made a choice of 5-15 minute sampling intervals. In this direction, the development of machine learning techniques to analyse coarse water data becomes increasingly interesting. While there is little work in disaggregating coarse water data [5] , it is worth noting that there is a rich energy disaggregation literature, a.k.a. Non-Intrusive Appliance Load Monitoring (NIALM), which typically employs variants of Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) such as Iterative HMMs [6] and Conditional, Factorial HMMs [7] . A common weakness of these approaches is that they assume a-priori knowledge of the number of fixtures exhibiting unique profile characteristics. Further, the effectiveness of learning (training) a complex HMM typically depends on a good choice of initial parameters.
In this paper we focus on bespoke aggregate water data privacy challenges and solutions and we introduce a lightweight disaggregation, privacy evaluation and incongruence detection algorithm running in real-time within the Complex Event Processor (CEP) of WSO2. The algorithm comprises of three main parts. The first process involves an unsupervised classifier of fixture-level water events (e.g. sink, washing machine, toilet, and shower). The parameters of this classifier are trained by mapping density-based clusters of aggregate filtered water data, into profile states of hypothetical consumption fixtures. The result of this process, may then be used by a range of NIALM algorithms, contributing towards a realistic, truly unsupervised algorithm. The second process uses the bespoke classifier to detect particular water events in real time. Finally, the third part analyses the privacy content of disaggregated information and it provides a guarantee of sufficient level of privacy protection through data aggregation. Further, the privacy algorithm helps distinguish between the detection of atypical water (human) usage behaviour, and incongruent data due to technical faults or system security attacks. The whole process lends itself to applications in the Smart Grid, where energy disaggregation and smart meter privacy are also particularly important.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The ICeWater project and forecasting algorithms are discussed in §2; the methodology and algorithms of this paper are introduced in §3; platform implementation details are provided in §4; numerical results are given in §5; and conclusions are drawn in §6.
The ICeWater project
The ICeWater system is based on a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) communication platform, where a publish / subscribe mechanism integrates diverse sensor types with the web services through suitable adapters. However, integration of DSSs, sensor / meter infrastructure and models tend to be expensive and bespoke solutions are not flexible or easily scalable. A proposed solution architecture to tackle this problem is currently being implemented by ICeWater project and deployed to support trials in Timisoara (Romania) and Milan (Italy) [8] . The integration platform used by ICeWater is based on open source components provided by WSO2 (www.wso2.org). The rationale behind this approach is that WSO2 functionality is both comprehensive and offers high performance [9] . ICeWater security is orchestrated by an Integration and Security Layer (ISL), which underpins access control, service routing and system management. The ISL uses integration platforms offered by WSO2, including the Business Activity Monitor (BAM), Identity Server (IS), API Manager (APIM), Enterprise Service Bus (ESB), Governance Registry (GReg), and CEP, which is described further in §4.
Forecasting and anomaly detection
While the focus of this paper is on disaggregation, incongruence detection and privacy evaluation of water events, these algorithms may further lend themselves to, and interplay with, demand forecasting. In fact, the premise of this paper is that demand estimation is an integral part of privacy analytics.
Water consumption forecasting is useful for enabling utilities to optimise pump scheduling taking advantage of lower energy tariffs, plan network and meter replacements and for leakage detection. However, it is a challenge due to the variation between customers that can occur even within the same locality. The reason for this variation is mostly dependent on the number of occupants within a dwelling, but also due to work / lifestyle habits. For instance, the difference between weekday and weekend consumption patterns is usually significant in both residential and business areas. Some forecasting techniques take into account a number of exogenous variables and also other factors such as obtained during a census [10] . However, it is also possible to mine the historic consumption data to classify the data according to the underlying patterns without such knowledge. Typical methods include artificial neural networks and regression analysis of data over different time periods. Within the ICeWater project a two stage approach has been developed [11] and at the first stage the daily water demand patterns (i.e., time-series of hourly data) are analysed in order to identify a limited set of typical behaviours, over the time period taken into account. At the second stage, each dataset is separately analysed to obtain one specific daily water demand forecasting model, where each daily water demand forecasting model consists of a set of hourly water demand forecasting models.
The error between the hourly forecast and the actual consumption is the most interesting from the point of view of detecting anomalies or abnormal events. For instance, the percentage error provides a good indication of a potential problem (such as leakage or a significant demand event). The comparisons can be performed on an individual customer basis, or on aggregate consumption for groups of customers. In the ICeWater project the difference between the prediction and the actual hourly consumption is defined as the 'normality' (see Fig. 1 ). A positive normality indicates more actual consumption than forecast.
Missing AMR readings are a particular problem when AMR data is collected via a wireless network infrastructure (which is often the case). This can be caused by radio propagation anomalies or device related performance issues. Hence combining the normality of readings with the missing data (error) rates for corresponding AMRs permits the criticality to be calculated. Readings that are consistently close to the predictions (low absolute normality) are not as critical as readings that are often or recently abnormal. Hence, when determining whether missing readings are critical or not (i.e. can be reliably predicted) the normality is combined with the time since the last normal reading was successfully received (defined as severity). Above: original consumptions data sampled every approx. 5 minutes; below: estimated VFR signature sampled every 1 minute.
Methodology

Problem formulation
The underlying assumption for disaggregating water data readings into a trace of fixtures (or consumption activities) contributing to these readings, based on which privacy is evaluated, is that a volume of consumed water within an interval may be used to infer the identity of the combination of activities that consumed this water. To formalise this claim, suppose that the profile of an ith activity can be represented by a rectangular pulse of certain amplitude q i (t) ∈ Q ∪ {0}, where Q := {q 1 , . . . , q M }, 1 ≤ i ≤ M is a set of volumetric flow rates (VFRs) associated with M activity, and a corresponding pulse duration, T i . The aggregate VFR can be written as follows:
where u i (t) is the rectangular pulse of a unit amplitude and duration T i , τ i , and is the pulse shift. Clearly Q(t) can take 2
M different values, including 0. If Q(t) is obtained from sufficiently granular consumption measurements, then individual activity operation may be identified with high probability.
The overall method in this paper is adapted and significantly extended from [1] which in based on electricity data. An analogy between electricity and water measurements is drawn by mapping energy and instant power to volume and VFR, respectively.
Preprocessing and feature extraction
The reason for which we wish to convert volume data to VFR is that the latter feature characterises better the profile of a distinct water activity. That is, it is more likely that two fixtures consume the same volume as compared with consuming at the same flow rate. Further, volume measurements in the data might be irregular; e.g. in our data the sampling interval varied between 3 and 6 minutes. Thus, the feature of volume does not characterise the activity at the given timestamp, as opposed to VFR. However, the conversion to VFR is not straightforward because the start time of a consumption event is not known and thus the same fixture (with a constant VFR) is most likely to consume significantly different amounts of volumes in successive measurements. This may be further complicated if more than one activities start within an interval. Considering this challenges, we process input data as follows. 1) With given timestamp, convert litres to standard cubic cm per minute (sccm). 2) Synthesise a higher granularity timeline, with regular one minute samples. 3) Find the starting positions of positive VFR changes triggering a consumption event occuring in isolated blocks of two, and join the two edges into one. Repeat for negative VFR changes triggering an end event. 4) Move the VFR edges with a water-filling algorithm such that the original volume measurements are satisfied and fill in the gaps of the synthesised timeline. An example of this preprocessing is given in Fig. 2 Fig. 3 . Learning process that identifies activity profiles.
Step one (bottom set of clusters) uses DBSCAN to cluster O t and provides 50 cluster centres.
Step two (middle set of clusters) uses DBSCAN to reduce the cluster centres into 42.
Step tree (top level) traces the signal to identify most likely pairs of clusters that characterise a device FSM. For each pair (FSM) it outputs the [OFF-ON ON-OFF] VRF changes (in sccm), the frequency of appearance in the training data, the average duration of the cycle (time between ON and OFF states), and the average volume consumed (in litres). Training period of two weeks was used.
To optimise the operation of the machine learning algorithms we use as features a) the ΔQ t changes of VFR that are significant enough, i.e. above a leakage rate / variation of 100 sccm, b) the sum ΔQ t of changes in-between successive ΔQ t values, and c) the indexes of the ΔQ t values, which contain the duration between successive ΔQ t .
Training
The real-time disaggregation algorithm depends on the results of a training phase that involves learning the number and the consumption profiles of active water fixtures installed in different dwellings. We propose a customised unsupervised learning algorithm, which majorly advances the method of [12] .
A training trace of the objects O t = {ΔQ t , ΔQ t } is fed into a two-phase non-parametric clustering algorithm that is based on the DBSCAN clustering algorithm. Fundamentally, the algorithm will (iteratively) find cluster centres (C(ΔQ t )) that cluster together objects that are a) within a distance (which we set as a noise threshold of 100 sccm) and b) have a minimum cluster size (set to four). The learned set of clusters (comprising positive and negative C(ΔQ t )) are then analysed in order to identify the best combinations of ON-OFF events that correspond to the states of a Finite State Machine (FSM) that characterises the profile of a learned activity. Further details of this process is found in [12] . The three steps of this process (using DBSCAN twice followed by FSM optimisation) for one particular house are illustrated in Fig. 3 . The results of all 25 houses as comparison with ground truth are detailed in §5.
Real-time disaggregation
As discussed in the Introduction, here is a range of machine learning algorithms that may be used for NIALM of coarse data, most of which are based on variants of HMM. In this paper we use a simple method, based on a modified version of the knapsack optimisation problem, which we formulate as follows: maximise W(t) = N i=1 s j=1 w i, j (t)z i, j , subject to ΔQ t − Q n ≤ W(t) ≤ ΔQ t + Q n , where ΔQ t is the observed VFR, N is the number of FSMs, s = 2 the number of FSM states, Q n is a tolerance value, and w i, j (t) takes values from {0, 1} with the constrain that s i=1 w i, j (t) = 1, for all j, at any time t. We further set Q n = x − L, where L is a detected minimum (leakage) rate, and 0 ≤ x ≤ x max (= 400).
To optimise computationally the above problem, we construct an array representing all plausible solutions, in which we limit the number of concurrent activities to five. We then construct a lookup table by sorting the solutions that correspond to a choice of w i, j (t) and the associated W(t). Once constructed, the look-up table allows the detection algorithm (that follows) to find solutions almost instantly (in real-time) while maintaining the validity of FSM transitions.
This algorithm is chosen over other (HMM-based) ones as we currently have no ground truth of fixture consumption traces, and we thus we cannot compare performances. The disaggregation results are only used to analyse the privacy evaluation and incongruence detection methods that follow.
Privacy and incongruence detection
Adapting from [1] , we characterise a behaviour profile with an empirical probability distribution (EPD), which is defined by the relative frequency of the occurrences of all possible events. Assuming the knowledge of a disaggregated set of M water activities, there are 2 M possible events. For any particular time interval 0 ≤ t ≤ T the number of occurrences for each event can be counted in order to obtain an interval EPD. Further an expected (average) EPD may be obtained by counting across a sufficiently large number of sample paths.
Given a expected EPD Q p , the deviation of an interval EPD P p from Q p may be measured by functions which are in general called divergence measures D. Relative entropy, and mutual information are such measures that have been widely used as a data privacy metric. In this paper we use K-divergence given by
The advantages of the K-divergence (KD) as compared to the relative entropy is that it is always defined, for all values of P p and Q p , and its value is between zero and one. Using a data mining language, a large KD indicates an atypical bag of events, and a small KD indicates a typical bag of events. One way to understand this association is to look at the definition of KD: each term log
, and it will be zero if P p (b) = Q p (b); otherwise it will be negative. Thus, P p (b) >> Q p (b) is a sufficient condition for a spike in KD.
We support a premise that it is a fundamental privacy need to protect the occurrence of an atypical bag of events (intervals with high KD). That is, privacy is protected (no leakage) when the information distance between an observed interval EPD and an expected (average) EPD is small. Clearly, such a requirement is opposite to more classical privacy definitions based on data perturbation. To compare this approach with previous ones we make a remark: while one aspect of privacy is protected if D(P p ||P p ) is increased and thus higher distortions are introduced, another aspect of privacy is protected when the exposed bag of events is close to the expected one and contains no extraordinary (rare) events, i.e. the observed interval EPD yields a low D(P p ||Q p ). It should be clear that while a KD spike leaks information of rare events, persistently high values of KD do not necessarily infer low privacy protection; for example, continuous bags of random events will yield a high KD as compared with the expected one. This principle allows us to define a privacy level, as the average to peak ratio of a sequence of interval KD values, and an incongruence level simply as the average of a sequence of interval KD values.
Implementation
CEP is a becoming a widely accepted method for analysing multiple streams of data in order to infer with some degree of confidence that specific complex events have taken place. It correlates multiple simple events to detect the occurrence of complex events which otherwise could not be detected. The process is suited to real time streaming data scenarios and enables low latency decision making. Valuable information can be extracted from combining multiple related data streams. For example, in order to detect that a specific water consuming fixture is being operated when the only direct data source is a smart water meter providing a consumption rate, several data streams would need to be analysed. These may include event duration, event time of day, ambient temperature, water volume consumed and even consumption of other energy sources like electricity or gas.
We implement the real-time stream processing described in §3 as follows. 1) For each aggregate volume V t received and for each unique house ID, estimate the VFR ΔQ t , and disaggregate it by recalling the previous disaggregation result for compliance with FSM transitions. 2) If the timestamp of ΔQ t falls within a new hourly timeslot, then a) build a hourly behaviour pattern profile (for the 1 hour timeslot that has just elapsed), b) compare the hourly pattern with the expected one, and c) output a privacy and incongruence level (for the hour). 3) If the timestamp of ΔQ t falls within a new day, then a) build a daily behaviour pattern profile (for the day that has just elapsed), b) compare the daily pattern with the expected one and c) output a privacy and incongruence level (for the day).
The WSO2 CEP implementation is based on the open source Siddhi CEP. The implementation is highly flexible and supports several data stream source options including Java Message Service brokers, Email and HTTP REST Calls. Sensors or other supporting systems can deposit raw data using specially defined HTTP endpoints. These event delivery mechanisms interface with the CEP system through the use of Input Event Adapters. From here simple events can be captured by extracting data from well-defined data formats such as XML or JSON. The data streams are continuously monitored for the occurrence of simple events by searching for specific elements or tags using Event Builders. Once detected, these simple events are made available to the Siddhi Engine for complex event processing. Once enough simple events have been collected to indicate an occurrence of a complex event, the complex event is formatted using an output Event Formatter which allows output events to be generated in several well defined data formats. An Output Event Adapter is used to deliver this formatted complex event to a database for offline analysis and / or other interested entities for low latency decision making. Fig. 4 shows our proposed architecture. XML, HTTP, and SQL technologies are used to obtain, transmit, extract and store events. The green arrow represents a detected simple event in the incoming data stream. It represents only one of multiple simple events that would be needed to produce the complex event shown by the red arrows. The complex event is passed to two separate Output Adapters, one HTTP and one SQL. This allows the event to be forwarded to additional services such as a web based graphing or visualisation service and also stored in a standard database for further offline analysis.
As previously described, the system we are proposing has three primary components. 1) The unsupervised fixture/activity classifier which operates on aggregate volumetric flow rate data to generate activity profiles and system training data. 2) The complex event detector based on the Siddhi CEP engine which operates on the real time volumetric flow rate data from a smart water meter and also input from the offline activity training data. and 3) A privacy verification system which ensures output data does not violate reasonable expectations of customer privacy. These are depicted in Fig. 4 . The offline training process represents the first major component. It provides per-household, and hence privacy sensitive, classifications. This data allows the CEP, the second major component, to accurately determine which water activities are being used in real-time. The privacy sensitive outputs from this system are stored in a secure database. The third major component, the privacy verifier takes this sensitive data and formats and aggregates it until the privacy level passes a configurable threshold. The sanitised but still valuable data is then freely available to use in other water utility systems without any customer privacy concerns impeding operations.
Results
We use data generated by the Waterville iWidget project, (http://waterville.hrwallingford.com/waterville/), which allows the user to specify their own assessment of the behaviour of consumption activities. The realisation of consumption events is determined based on probabilities that are dependent on the hour of the day as well as the previous states. Here we analyse 30 days worth of water volume consumption data sampled at each house water meter point approximately every five minutes, for 25 houses with different consumption profiles and a number of occupants. The profiles used for the current data are shown in Table 1 .
We evaluate the offline training results by a) choosing the best possible mapping between the profiles learned from the algorithm and the ground truth labels. If the case where more than one learned activities mapped to the same label, the mapping allocates the closest VFR feature to the label, and classifies the other as 'Unknown' (U). The overall accuracy results, as well as characteristics of different houses, are given in Table 2 . We observe that the algorithm exhibits high accuracy results for all activities, apart perhaps from the case of the dishwasher. This is due to a frequent variability of water consumption during one cycle of this fixture. We note that as DBSCAN clusters together neighbouring values, it mitigates the noise resulting from a variability in the VFR as well as the estimation of the start time correction. We also notice that the activities of the running tap and washing up are less likely not to be allocated to a label, as compared with other activities. This may also be attributed to the lack of sufficient granularity of the ground truth profile; a more granular activity labelling (e.g. washing up after lunch or dinner or afternoon tea) may improve the mapping and the classification results. While the available dataset does not include the ground truth for each fixture over time, and the performance of the disaggregation algorithm cannot be tested, it is still possible to infer privacy and incongruence levels. We first make a few observations based on extended analysis of the KD between a daily / hourly interval EPD and the daily / hourly average EPD for the 30 days. We define events as a combination of activities that are concurrently consuming water (ON-ON duration) . Further, the EPDs may include the zero (Z) event event, which signifies zero aggregate consumption, or may only focus only on non-zero events (NZ), in which case a better insight is obtained on (sparse) activity variation, as the prevalence of the zero event dilutes other probabilities to low scores. A good example is given in Fig. 5 where the following further observations are made: the spike at Day 15 (top left), which alarms a low privacy protection level, is linked with an atypical EPD (bottom left) in which there is unusually high meal and cooking preparation activity. Interestingly enough, a high washing up activity is only detected on the following day. The high atypicality exhibited at particular times for Days 1, 11 and 21 (top left) is attributed to proportionally higher leakage classification, which would require further investigation. One reason may be erroneous disaggregation result and detection leakage, which is visualised on the timeline on the bottom right of Fig. 5 . Table 2 . Accuracy of training process (in %) of identified VFRs of water activity profiles as compared to corresponding ground truth VFRs given in Table 1 . n(U) is the number of other identified activities that cannot be matched with a ground truth label (due to conflict with a better match). A blank accuracy of a ground truth label means that it's activity profile was not identified during training. 
Conclusions
This paper presents an unsupervised water fixture profile identification and fixture-level trace disaggregation method, which is used for the purposes of privacy and incongruence analytics. These algorithms are designed for implementation on the Complex Event Processor (CEP) of WSO2, employed by the IceWater project.
With current activity identification results exhibiting high accuracy, future work will be extended in a number of directions. 1) Disaggregation, privacy and incongruence algorithms will be evaluated using real data, and the effect of sampling frequency and building-block aggregation will be studied. 2) Hourly consumption predictions and HMM may be used to improve the detection and privacy algorithms. 3) A detection of complex anomalies such as cyber-physical security attacks may be tested in a system simulation. From an implementation point of view, while a single stream processing benefits from the CEP's ancillary functions (input/output adapters and time or event-based sliding/batch windows), a more involved CEP usage will investigate multi-modal data fusion of water, electricity, and wearable data aiming to improve the performance of event detection algorithms. 
